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Kidnapping: A Modern Definition
John L. Diamond*
I. INTRODUCTION
Although kidnapping is an infamous crime, perceived by the pub-
lic with both dread and morbid curiosity,1 and the subject of fine liter-
ature,' it is also a crime that has eluded meaningful definition.' The
common law offense is now codified in state penal laws, but the lan-
guage in these statutes is frequently ambiguous and potentially
overbroad.4
* Associate Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.
B.A., Yale College; Dipl. Crim., Emmanuel College, Cambridge University; J.D., Columbia Law
School.
The author would like to express his appreciation for the excellent research assistance of
William Green, Michael V. Hoffman, Mark A. Landis, Daven G. Lowhurst, and Joseph R.
Ramrath.
The author also expresses his gratitude to Professors David I. Levine, Scott E. Sundby and
Louis B. Schwartz of the University of California, Hastings College of the Law, for their helpful
comments on an earlier draft.
1. According to a study by Ernest Alix, the New York Times reported 1,703 cases of kid-
napping occurring entirely or in part in the United States between 1874 and 1974, including 236
"classic kidnapping[s] for ransom." E.K. ALIX, RANSOM KIDNAPPING IN AMERICA, 1874-1974
166-67 (1978). It has been suggested that the development of the automobile and organized
crime during the prohibition years led to an increase in ransom kidnapping in the late 1920's and
1930's. Id. at 43-49, 67-77; see also, Kanter, Kidnapping, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND
JUSTICE 993-94 (1983); Note, A Rationale of the Law of Kidnapping, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 540
(1953).
One of the most infamous kidnappings of this century took place on March 1,1932, when
the infant son of Charles Lindberg was abducted from his home and eventually killed. State v.
Hauptmann, 115 N.J.L. 412, 180 A. 809 (1935). However, the alleged kidnapper, Bruno Rich-
ard Hauptman, was not prosecuted for kidnapping. At that time, in New Jersey, kidnapping was
only a high misdemeanor and therefore the statutory felony murder rule could only be invoked if
the prosecutor could find some other crime that would supply the necessary felony. Since the
stealing of a child could not sustain a burglary conviction at common law, the prosecutor chose
to allege that Hauptmann had intended to steal the child's sleeping suit. The prosecutor was
successful and Hauptmann was executed. Id.; see also Kanter, supra, at 993, 994-95.
2. See, eg., R.L. STEVENSON, KIDNAPPED (1886).
3. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.1 comment at 220-22 (1980).
4. For example, the New York Court of Appeals could at one point do no better than to
merely "explain" that the New York statute was intended to cover "kidnapping in the conven-
tional sense in which that term has now come to have acquired meaning." People v. Levy, 15
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The original concept of kidnapping was clear. As Perkins defines
it, "[a]t common law kidnapping was ... the forcible abduction or
stealing away of a man, woman or child from his own country and
sending him into another."5 Kidnapping was originally a misde-
meanor punishable with a fine, short imprisonment and pillory.6 It
developed out of the related misdemeanor of false imprisonment7 and
has been described as the "most aggravated form of false
imprisonment."'
The term kidnapping emerged in English case law towards the
N.Y.2d 159, 164-65, 204 N.E.2d 842, 844, 256 N.Y.S.2d 793, 796 (1965). See also, Annot., 43
A.L.R. 3d 699 (1972 & Supp. 1984).
The federal law on kidnapping requires generally that the victim be "willfully transported in
interstate or foreign commerce." 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(1976 & Supp. 1985). The statute also
covers persons kidnapped within special maritime, territorial, and aircraft jurisdictions of the
United States, as well as certain foreign and government officials. These sections do not require
interstate or foreign transportation of the victim. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1201(a)(2), (a)(3), (a)(4), 351(b),
1751(b)(1976 & Supp. 1985). The statute also provides a rebuttable presumption that a victim
detained for 24 hours has been transported in interstate or foreign commerce. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1201(b)(1976 & Supp. 1985). But see U.S. v. Moore, 571 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1978), holding the
rebuttable presumption unconstitutional.
The general requirement of interstate or foreign transportation substantially limits the occa-
sions when federal kidnapping charges can be applied for abductions involving short amounts of
asportation. See also related federal provisions on hostage taking for the purpose of compelling a
third person or a governmental organization from doing or abstaining from doing any act (18
U.S.C. § 1203 (1976 & Supp. 1985)), enticement into slavery (18 U.S.C. § 1583 (1976 & Supp.
1985)), and abductions associated with attempting to avoid apprehension for bank robbery and
related crimes (18 U.S.C. § 2113 (1976 & Supp. 1985)).
5. R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 229 (3d ed. 1982). The term "kidnapping"
according to the Oxford English Dictionary was originally used to refer to stealing or "carrying
off (children or others) in order to provide servants or labourers for the American plantations."
5 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 691 (1933).
The word is a compound of "nap" (related entymologically to the word of "nab"), meaning
snatch, and "kid," which probably originally meant any indentured servant brought to the
American colonies, including but not limited to children. Napier, Detention Offenses at Common
Law, in RESHAPING THE CRIMINAL LAW 190, 194-96 (1978); See MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.1
comment at 210-20; See also Note, From Blackstone to Inni: A Judicial Search for a Definition
of Kidnapping, 16 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 367, 368-74 (1982).
6. EAsr, I E.H. PLEAS OF THE CROWN 429-30 (1803).
7. Perkins defines false imprisonment as "the unlawful confinement of a person." PER-
KINS & BOYCE, supra note 5, at 224. The common law crime of false imprisonment can be traced
back to the Magna Carta. Lambert, Kidnapping and Imprisonment at Common Law, 10 CAM-
BRIA L. REv. 20, 21 (1978-79).
S. EAST, supra note 6, at 429, 430. See PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 5, at 229 n.2 (and
accompanying text, concurring with East). Perkins also argues that an infant can be a victim of
false imprisonment. Id., at 224. But see Williams, The Kidnapping of Children, NEW L.J. 278
(1984), suggesting that:
whereas false imprisonment involves an issue of the victim's consent (so that it is virtu-
ally impossible to imprison a baby falsely), a charge of kidnapping a young child in-
volves an inquiry into the consent of the parent or guardians. If this is so, East's
description of kidnapping as an aggravated false imprisonment is true only for persons
beyond the age of (presumably) 14.
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end of the 17th century. It was used to describe the forced recruit-
ment of labor for the American colonies.9 Contemporary statutes
have changed the original common law crime in key ways. Kidnap-
ping is now a felony punishable in some states by life imprisonment.
In addition, the requirement that the victim must be transported out
of the country has been abandoned.
Although state laws still define kidnapping in terms of movement
of the victim, there is much uncertainty regarding the amount of
movement necessary to elevate what might simply be an assault with
brief confinement to the serious crime of kidnapping. This confusion
exists even in states where numerous appellate decisions have pur-
ported to clarify the crime.10
9. Napier reports "the earliest occurrence of the word" in the English law reports ap-
peared in Boly, (1686) comb. 10, although Dessigny, (1682) T. Raym 474, decided four years
earlier, used the term "spirited away" and probably is "also an instance of the offense." Napier,
supra note 5, at 194-95. While the facts in Baily were not reported, in Dessigny a student at
Merchant Taylor's School was transported to Jamaica and the defendant was fined 500 pounds.
Id.
The practice of forced recruitment of labor for the American colonies ended as colonial
independence approached and by the 1770's, according to Napier, the crime of kidnapping
"enter[ed] a long period of legal oblivion in England." Id. at 195-96. Although the term contin-
ued to enjoy popular usage in England, it was not until the twentieth century that kidnapping
reemerged in English Criminal Law reports. Id. While a New Hampshire decision as early as
1837 (State v. Rollins, 8 N.H. 550 (1837)) held that transportation out of the country was not a
prerequisite to the crime, it was not until 1937 that the Court of Criminal Appeal in Nodder
(unreported) held foreign asportation was no longer required to sustain a kidnapping conviction
in England. Id Note, supra note 5, at 368-74; see, MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.1 comment at
210-20 (1980). See also, Kanter, supra note 1, at 993-96; Lambert, supra note 7, at 21-23.
10. Statutory variations and potential ambiguity also exist in comparative crimes in foreign
penal codes. Germany, for example, makes it unlawful to seize a human being "for the purpose
of putting him into a helpless situation, or for the purpose of placing him in slavery, serfdom, or
a foreign military or naval service." GERMAN CRIMINAL CODE § 234, reprinted in The German
Penal Code of 1871, 4 THE AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES 121 (1961). France,
Poland, and Greece look to the length of time that the victim is confined to establish aggravated
offenses for unlawful imprisonment. The Polish statute increases the penalty if the perpetrator
"deprives a human being of liberty" for longer than 14 days. Polish Criminal Code art. 165 §§ 1-
2, reprinted in The Penal Code of the Polish People's Republic, 19 THE AMERICAN SERIES OF
FOREIGN PENAL CODES 81 (1973). The French statute imposes additional punishment if the
"unlawful imprisonment of detention" lasts longer than one month. FRENCH CRIMINAL CODE
§§ 341-44, reprinted in The French Penal Code, I THE AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL
CODES 117 (1960). The French Penal Code also makes it unlawful to kidnap a minor (article
354), and the penalty is aggravated if the minor is under 15 years of age (article 355). There is
also a special provision which applies to custody disputes (article 357). Id. §§ 354, 355, 357, at
120-21. Greek law punishes "one who by means of fraud or force seized another so that he is
deprived of protection of the state ... especially if reduced into slavery or into some similar
condition." GREEK PENAL CODE, Ch. 18, art. 322, reprinted in The Greek Penal Code, 154-56,
18 THE AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES (1973). Greece also aggravates punish-
ment for unlawful detention "if the detention is continued for a long period of time". Id. Ch. 18,
art. 325, at 154-56. The Criminal Code of the Soviet Union imposes punishment for "deprivation
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The purpose of this Article is to analyze the serious efforts of sev-
eral states to define kidnapping and the proposals advanced in the
Model Penal Code.
Four states (California, New York, Michigan, and Kansas) and
the Model Penal Code were chosen for analysis in this article because
each represents a distinct approach to the problem of kidnapping.
In California, very minimal movement of the victim is required.
New York, on the other hand, has developed a merger doctrine to
limit kidnapping to what courts have labeled "conventional kidnap-
ping." In Michigan, the Supreme Court has formulated factors to
measure asportation incidental to kidnapping. Kansas has rejected all
three of the foregoing tests and instead has chosen to focus on whether
the asportation substantially facilitates another crime. Finally, the
Model Penal Code's approach suggests that the quintessential issue is
whether the victim is kept in substantial isolation from his normal en-
vironment; a requirement which the Code indicates can be satisfied by
either substantial time or asportation. 11
of freedom" and increases the penalty if the act is "committed in a manner dangerous for the life
or health of the victim in conjunction with causing him physical suffering." The Criminal Code
of the RSFSR, Art. 126, reprinted in THE SOVIET CODES OF LAW 107 (W.B. Simons ed., 1980).
The Criminal Code of the Soviet Union also prohibits "[the abduction of another's infant or the
substitution of an infant, committed for mercenary purposes or for other base motives." Id.
Article 125, at 107. Italy punishes for false imprisonment and aggravates the offense if it is "(1)
to the detriment of an ascendant, or a descendant or a spouse; or (2) by a public officer, through
abuse of the powers pertaining to his office." ITALIAN PENAL CODE, Sec. II, art. 605, reprinted
in The Italian Penal Code, 23 THE AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES 204 (1978).
The ITALIAN PENAL CODE also has provisions against slavery and subjugation. Id. at 203.
Confusion over the common law concept of kidnapping, "the stealing and carrying away or
secreting of some person," prompted the Criminal Law Revision Commission in England to
propose that kidnapping be restricted to when a person is detained "to ransom, as a hostage or to
cause the victim to be sent out of the realm" or when the perpetrator "uses drugs or the threat of
injury to detain a person." The majority of the Commission would also apply the crime when-
ever force is used to detain another. It was proposed that other forms of imprisonment be pun-
ished less significantly. CRIMINAL LAw REVISIONS COMMITTEE, WORKING PAPER ON
OFFENSES AGAINST THE PERSON 56-61 (1976). The parameters of kidnapping and false impris-
onment in England are not free from controversy or uncertainty. See, eg., id.; see also Napier,
supra note 5, at 190.
11. The commentary to the adopted draft of the MODEL PENAL CODE states that:
Although the core of the contemplated offense is substantial "isolation" of the victim,
difficulty was encountered in attempting to draft the provisions expressly in those
terms. A draft debated by the Council of the Institute would have declared a person
guilty of kidnapping "if he removes another to a place where he is isolated from the
protection of law or the aid of others .... Although this language captures the crux
of the offense, objection was raised on the ground that it might require proof that the
victim had actually reached the isolated place where the kidnapper meant to hold him.
The prevailing view was that the crime should be complete where the victim has been
forced to leave the security of his house or place of business and enter the kidnapper's
car. Accordingly, the section was recast in terms of removing the victim "from" such
locations rather than transporting him "to" a place of isolation.
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This Article contends that current approaches inevitably will fal-
ter and continue to generate confusion through their use of the con-
cept of asportation. The Article urges that kidnapping ought to be
viewed as a distinct social harm most appropriately measured primar-
ily by the duration and condition of the victim's confinement. Only
when demands for ransom or the equivalent are made should even the
slightest duration of confinement automatically constitute kidnapping.
II. THE CALIFORNIA APPROACH: REQUIRING MINIMAL
MOVEMENT OF THE VICTIM
California has struggled to define how much movement of a vic-
tim should be required to constitute the crime of kidnapping. In Cot-
ton v. Superior Court, 12 the California Supreme Court held that Penal
Code section 207, providing "that any person who forcibly steals,
takes or arrests another and carries him from one part of the county to
another is guilty of kidnapping," 13 should not apply "where the move-
ment [of the victim] is incidental to [an] alleged assault." 4
Cotton involved prosecutions arising from a labor dispute in
which the AFL-CIO was attempting to induce Mexican contract
workers to join a strike for union contracts and higher hourly wages.
The kidnapping indictment was based mainly on an individual's alle-
gation that he had been dragged from a toilet "some fifteen feet,
thrown to the ground and kicked in the back and on his
legs.""i  Noting that prior to a 1905 amendment to section 207 of the
Penal Code kidnapping did not include movement of a victim "into
another part of the same county," 16 the court expressed its concern
that every defendant to an assault charge could also be subject to a
kidnapping prosecution "as long as the slightest movement [is]
involved."17
Eight years later in People v. Daniels,18 the California Supreme
Court construed the state's aggravated kidnapping statute, Penal Code
section 209, in light of its interpretation of simple kidnapping under
section 207 in Cotton. The aggravated kidnapping statute subjects the
defendant to more severe penalties, but requires proof that the kidnap-
MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.1 (1980). See also infra notes 153-163 and accompanying text.
12. 56 Cal. 2d 459, 364 P.2d 241, 15 Cal. Rptr. 65 (1961).
13. CAL. PENAL CODE § 207 (West Supp. 1984).
14. Cotton, 56 Cal. 2d at 464, 364 P.2d at 244, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 68 (emphasis added).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 465, 364 P.2d at 244, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 68.
18. 71 Cal. 2d 1119, 459 P.2d 225, 80 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1969).
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ping was "for... ransom, reward or to commit extortion or to exact
from another person any money or valuable thing."'19
Earlier California Supreme Court decisions had construed section
209 as encompassing, in one case, movement of only twenty-two feet20
and, in another case, movement from a few feet to just over fifty feet.2t
Rejecting these decisions, a unanimous court found the reasoning in
Cotton regarding movement incidental to an assault applicable. The
California Supreme Court repudiated its earlier pronouncement that
"it is the fact, not the distance of forcible removal which constitutes
kidnapping in this state."' 22 The court held in Daniels that section 209
excluded "from its reach not only 'stand-still' robberies ... but also
those in which the movements of the victim are merely incidental to
the commission of the robbery and do not substantially increase the
risk of harm over and above that necessarily present in the crime of
robbery itself."
23
Thus, in order to uphold an aggravated kidnapping charge, Dan-
iels would require satisfaction of a two-prong test: (1) the movement
of the victim must be more than merely incidental to the robbery and
(2) the risk of harm must be substantially increased over that necessar-
ily present in a robbery.
The California Supreme Court applied this standard to conclude
19. CAL. PENAL CODE § 209 (West 1971 & Supp. 1985).
Under the California statutory law, the most significant difference between aggravated and
simple kidnapping, from the point of view of the defendant, is the large disparity in potential
sentences. If the defendant is convicted of simple kidnapping, he may be punished by "imprison-
ment in the State Prison for three, five, or seven years." Id. at § 208. However, a conviction for
aggravated kidnapping is punishable by "imprisonment in the State Prison for life .... Id. at
§ 209.
20. People v. Chessman, 38 Cal. 2d 166, 238 P.2d 1001, cert. denied, 343 U.S. 915 (1951).
In Chessman, the California Supreme Court upheld Caryl Chessman's kidnapping convic-
tion and sentenced him to death. Chessman had robbed a couple at gunpoint and then forced the
woman to move 22 feet away to his car. Once there, Chessman forced the woman to submit to
his sexual demands. The court ruled that the 22 foot movement was sufficient asportation to
constitute kidnapping under California law. The ruling was quite significant since the robbery
and sexual violations would not have permitted the court to impose capital punishment on
Chessman. However, at that time kidnapping was a capital offense and after numerous stays and
appeals, Caryl Chessman was finally executed in 1960, twelve years after his crimes. Id. See
Kanter, supra note 1, at 993, 995:
"[A]s reprehensible as the defendant's conduct in these cases was, its seriousness lay in the
sexual and assaultive nature of the underlying crimes rather than in some independent harm that
arose from any 'kidnapping'."
21. People v. Wein, 50 Cal. 2d 383, 326 P.2d 457, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 866, reh'g denied,
358 U.S. 896, cert. denied, 359 U.S. 992 (1958).
22. Daniels, 71 Cal. 2d at 1139, 459 P.2d at 238, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 910 (quoting Chessman, 38
Cal. 2d at 192, 238 P.2d at 1017).
23. Id
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when, as in Daniels, the defendant in the course of a robbery "does no
more than move his victim around inside the premises in which he
finds him,"24 his conduct would not generally constitute aggravated
kidnapping. Despite this particular application, what would gener-
ally constitute merely "incidental" asportation under the Daniels stan-
dard remained ambiguous.
People v. Timmons25 addressed the question whether the Daniels
aggravated kidnapping test was satisfied when the defendant com-
pelled two victims to drive approximately five city blocks, in their own
car, during the course of robbing them. Although force was
threatened, no weapon was displayed. The California Supreme Court
held that the victim's movement was only "incidental to the commis-
sion of the robbery."26 The decision concluded that "'incidental'...
within the meaning of Daniels" included a "reasonably brief move-
ment for the purpose of facilitating the commission of a robbery."27
Timmons characterized the car as merely the "moving situs" of the
robbery which (1) facilitated the crime by allowing "less danger of
detection" than a stationary situs such as a busy parking lot, and (2)
24. Id. at 1140, 459 P.2d at 238, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 910.
Although Daniels and Cotton clearly established that both simple and aggravated kidnap-
ping in California required some minimal asportation, the Daniels decision acknowledged in two
footnotes the extent of the ambiguity that remained as to what would constitute either simple or
aggravated kidnapping. The Daniels court, in one footnote, declined to rule on whether the facts
of Cotton would be sufficient to constitute aggravated kidnapping if an intent to commit robbery
had been established. Daniels, 71 Cal. 2d at 1139 n.5, 459 P.2d at 232 n.5, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 904
n.5. Presumably, what constitutes "incidental movement" for the crime of assault might not
constitute "incidental movement" for the crime of robbery which, unlike the crime of assault,
constitutes a basis for liability under California's aggravated kidnapping statute. In another foot-
note, the court refused to decide how the new Daniels standard would be applied in the factual
context of People v. Chessman. Daniels, 71 Cal. 2d at 1140 n.14, 459 P.2d at 238 n.14, 80 Cal.
Rptr. at 910 n.14 (discussing Chessman, 38 Cal. 2d at 166, 238 P.2d at 1001 (1951)). In Chess-
man, the California Supreme Court upheld an aggravated kidnapping conviction based on the
pre-Daniels rule that the distance of the forcible removal was irrelevant to the crime. The victim
in Chessman was forced to move only 22 feet to facilitate the planned robbery (as well as six
other crimes), but the movement entailed removal from the victim's escort's car to the defend-
ant's car. Thus, the court in Daniels did not determine whether asportation amounting to 22 feet
from one vehicle to another satisfied the new Daniels test for aggravated kidnapping.
25. 4 Cal. 3d 411, 482 P.2d 648, 93 Cal. Rptr. 736 (1971).
Earlier, in People v. Williams, 2 Cal. 3d 894, 471 P.2d 1008, 1013, 88 Cal. Rptr. 208, 213
(1970), the California Supreme Court applied the Daniels test to a victim who was seized from
his place of business. In Williams, the defendant forced a gas station attendant first into the
station's office and later into the "lube room," where the defendant took the victim's wallet. The
attendant was brought back to the station's office and then required, along with a customer, to
walk down the street. The California Supreme Court concluded that the movements were "brief
and ... solely to facilitate the commission of the crime of robbery" and consequently reversed
the aggravated kidnapping conviction. Id.
26. Timmons, 4 Cal. 3d at 414, 482 P.2d at 650, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 738.
27. Id.
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which aided the defendant's escape by transporting the eyewitnesses to
a location where it was more difficult to cause an alarm.28
The Timmons decision also concluded the second branch of the
Daniels test, requiring that the asportation "substantially increase the
risk of harm," was not satisfied because the movement of the car in-
creased only the risk of robbery.29 Timmons interpreted the Daniels
test to require the increased risk from asportation to refer to the dan-
ger of "significant physical injuries over and above those to which a
victim of the underlying crime is normally exposed."3° In Timmons,
the court concluded that forcing the victims to drive their own car five
blocks down city streets in broad daylight did not "substantially in-
crease the risk of harm" beyond that inherent in the crime of rob-
bery.31 The court also observed that the defendant was not armed, the
police were not in hot pursuit, and there was no high speed chase or
other reckless driving. The court noted, however, that under different
circumstances a "movement of five city blocks might well 'substan-
tially' increase the risk and thereby expose the robber to a prosecution
for kidnapping. '"32
In People v. Stanworth, 33 the California Supreme Court reaffirmed
28. Id.
29. Id. (quoting Daniels, 71 Cal. 2d 1119, 1140, 459 P.2d 225, 238, 80 Cal. Rptr. 897, 910
(1969)).
30. People v. Timmons, 4 Cal. 3d 411, 414, 482 P.2d 648, 650, 93 Cal. Rptr. 736, 738
(1971).
31. Id. at 415-16, 482 P.2d at 651, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 739.
32. Id. at 416 n.2, 482 P.2d at 651 n.2, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 739 n.2. The California Supreme
Court expressly distinguished People v. Ramirez, 2 Cal. App. 3d 345, 82 Cal. Rptr. 665 (1969),
an earlier appellate court decision upholding a kidnapping charge. In Ramirez, the defendants
forced an intended rape victim into their car and subsequently became involved in a high speed
chase which resulted in a fatal accident. The court in Timmons also emphasized that the Daniels
test did not preclude liability for kidnapping when a robber merely moves his victim around
inside the premises where he finds him. Daniels had indicated that such conduct would "gener-
ally" not constitute aggravated kidnapping. However, the Timmons court noted that there may
be circumstances where such movement would substantially increase the risk to a victim, permit-
ting liability for aggravated kidnapping under section 209 of the CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE.
Timmons, 4 Cal. 3d. at 415, 482 P.2d at 650, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 738 (1971).
33. 11 Cal. 3d 588, 522 P.2d 1058, 114 Cal. Rptr. 250 (1974).
Prior to Stanworth, in In re Crompton, 9 Cal. 3d 463, 507 P.2d 74, 106 Cal. Rptr. 770
(1973), the California Supreme Court attempted to clarify the requirements imposed by the sec-
ond prong of the Daniels test. In Crompton, the defendant pointed a pistol at a service station
attendant and forced him from the service island to the station office and then behind a truck
parked on the premises 20 to 30 feet away. After searching the pockets of the victim and taking a
set of keys to the station, the defendant's companion shot and wounded the victim. The court
concluded the victim's compelled asportation was merely "incidental" to the robbery and conse-
quently failed the first prong of the Daniels test. Id. at 466, 507 P.2d at 76, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 772.
As an independent ground for its decision, the court concluded that the second prong of the
Daniels test was also not satisfied because "the act of forcing the attendant to move behind the
HeinOnline -- 13 Am. J. Crim. L.  8 1985-1986
Kidnapping
the two-pronged Daniels test for determining the minimum asporta-
tion required for an aggravated kidnapping prosecution under section
209. However, the court rejected the test as inappropriate for the de-
termination of the minimum asportation required under section 207
for simple kidnapping.
Stanworth involved convictions for both simple and aggravated
kidnapping. The aggravated kidnapping charge was brought against
the defendant who dragged one of his victims approximately twenty-
five feet from a road to an open field. He then bound the victim's
hands with wire, forcibly raped her, and stole approximately fifteen
dollars from her purse. The Stanworth court held that the Daniels
asportation requirement invalidated the aggravated kidnapping con-
viction. The court concluded that the movement of twenty-five feet
was "merely incidental" to the accompanying crimes,34 since it was
"accomplished for the specific purpose of raping and robbing" the vic-
tim.3" In analyzing the second prong of Daniels, the court found no
evidence that the movement of the victim substantially increased the
risk of physical harm beyond that risk inherent in the underlying
crime.
36
In upholding four simple kidnapping convictions, however, the
Stanworth court rejected any implication that the Daniels test for min-
imum asportation also applied to prosecutions for simple kidnapping
under section 207. In Stanworth, two of the defendant's victims had
been ordered at gunpoint to walk to a small hill approximately one-
quarter of a mile away from the car in which they had hitched a ride.
After ordering the two women victims to disrobe, the defendant fatally
shot both of them and then proceeded to have sexual intercourse with
one of the victims. A third victim was forcibly driven in a car five to
ten miles and the fourth was forced to travel on a freeway from one
city to another.
The court reviewed People v. Cotton, which was at the time the
leading "simple kidnapping" case. Cotton had invalidated a simple
truck did not substantially increase the risk of harm over and above that normally present in the
crimes of robbery and assault." Id. at 466, 467, 507 P.2d at 76, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 772. The court
expressly rejected the argument that "the risk was aggravated by diminishing the likelihood of
public observation of the infliction of physical harm on the attendant." Id. at 467, 507 P.2d at
76, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 772. Reviewing several earlier cases, the court held that "such acts of
removing the victim from public view do not in themselves substantially increase the risk of harm
within" the Daniels rule. Id.
34. Stanworth, 11 Cal. 3d at 598, 522 P.2d at 1065, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 257.
35. Id.
36. Id.
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kidnapping conviction for movements that were "only incidental""a to
the defendant's other offenses. Nevertheless, the Stanworth majority
rejected the inference from the phrase in Cotton that in order to consti-
tute simple kidnapping the movement of a victim must be "more than
incidental" to an underlying offense. Instead, the court focused on the
statement in Cotton that "the legislature did not intend to apply crimi-
nal sanctions where the 'slightest movement' is involved."3" From this
language, the court developed a new standard: for simple kidnapping,
movement of the victim may not be "slight" or "insubstantial." 9 In
relation to the movements of all four victims discussed above, the
court found that the asportations were neither "insubstantial" nor
"slight" and that the defendants would be liable for simple kidnap-
ping.4' The court noted 700 yards was found sufficiently substantial
movement in an earlier lower appellate decision upholding a simple
kidnapping conviction.4
By deciding not to judge simple kidnapping asportation on
whether or not the movement is merely incidental to another offense,
the Stanworth decision departed from the first branch of the Daniels
test. The second branch of the Daniels test, which required a substan-
tial increase in the risk of harm over and above that necessarily pres-
ent in the underlying crimes, was also found inappropriate to simple
kidnapping, because simple kidnapping need not occur in connection
with another offense.42
Stanworth thus established that for simple kidnapping, the vic-
tim's forced movement should not be "slight" or "insubstantial,)
43
and endorsed a decision holding that 700 yards was not insubstan-
tial.4' The court left unspecified what constitutes slight or insubstan-
tial asportation.
Two post-Stanworth California Supreme Court decisions reduced
the apparent differences between the asportation requirements for sim-
ple and aggravated kidnapping. In People v. Thornton,45 the defend-
37. Id. at 600, 522 P.2d at 1067, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 259 (quoting Cotton v. Superior Court,
56 Cal. 2d 459, 464, 364 P.2d 241, 244, 15 Cal. Rptr. 65, 68 (1961)).
38. Id.
39. id. at 603, 522 P.2d at 1069, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 261.
40. Id.
41. People v. Apo, 25 Cal. App. 3d 790, 794, 102 Cal. Rptr. 242,245 (1972). In Apo, a large
crowd of students motivated by allegations of racial discrimination, surrounded three college
officials and forced them to march some 700 yards from the Physical Education Building to the
Administration Building.
42. Stanworth, 11 Cal. 3d at 601, 522 P.2d at 1068, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 260.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 603, 522 P.2d at 1068-69, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 261.
45. 11 Cal. 3d 738, 523 P.2d 267, 114 Cal. Rptr. 467 (1974).
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ant forced his way into the victim's car and drove the victim "some
four blocks"46 keeping her pinned to the seat with his arm around her
throat. The defendant parked the car, then robbed and sexually as-
saulted the victim. In another incident, the same defendant ap-
proached a different victim who was standing outside a tavern. With a
pistol to her back, he ordered the victim to walk about a block to a
parked car. There he robbed and then sexually assaulted her for sev-
eral hours. The California Supreme Court, applying the Daniels test,
upheld the aggravated kidnapping conviction for both of these
incidents.
Evaluating the facts under the Daniels two prong test, the court
held that:
[t]he fact that in each case defendant chose to consummate
the robbery at a location remote from the place of initial con-
tact does not render the subsequent asportation 'merely inci-
dental' to the crime, for it is the very fact that defendant
utilized substantial asportation in the commission of the
crime which renders him liable to the increased penalty of
section 209 if that asportation was such that the victim's risk
of harm was substantially increased thereby.47
The Thornton court, therefore, seemed to construe Daniels' first re-
quirement of more than "incidental" asportation to mean simply "sub-
stantial" movement. The facts in Thornton suggest even a movement
of one block would be "substantial".
The court in Thornton concluded that the second prong of Dan-
iels, which requires additional danger to the victim, was satisfied since
"any substantial asportation which involves forcible control of the
robbery victim ... exposes her to grave risks of harm to which she
would not have been subject had the robbery occurred at the point of
initial contact.""a After Thornton, the Daniels test would appear satis-
fied by asportation of at least a block in distance, so long as the victim
is compelled to move with the threat of bodily harm.
Thornton appeared inconsistent with the California Supreme
Court's earlier decision in Timmons which reversed an aggravated
kidnapping conviction for the more substantial asportation of five city
blocks. In In re Earley,4 9 the California Supreme Court directly ad-
dressed the inconsistency between Thornton and Timmons and reinter-
46. Id. at 747, 523 P.2d at 272, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 472.
47. Id. at 768, 523 P.2d at 287, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 487. A more substantial movement of the
victim occurred after the robbery in the latter incident but this court and a subsequent court
ignored it. See infra note 58.
48. Thornton, 11 Cal 3d at 768, 523 P.2d at 287, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 487.
49. 14 Cal.3d 122, 534 P.2d 721, 120 Cal. Rptr. 881 (1975).
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preted the Daniels test. In Earley, the defendant used a "gun-like"
derringer-styled cigarette lighter to enter the victim's car while it was
stopped at a light.5" The defendant drove the car, with the victim next
to him, a distance of 10 to 13 blocks. During the drive, the defendant
waved the "gun" threateningly at the victim. After stopping, the de-
fendant robbed the victim of his wallet and watch and fled on foot
without physically injuring the victim.
The Earley court expressly endorsed the Daniels test for aggra-
vated kidnapping and affirmed that both prongs need to be satisfied to
uphold a conviction.51 Nevertheless, in construing the first prong of
Daniels, which requires movement to be more than "merely incidental
to the commission of the robbery," the court acknowledged that
Thornton implicitly overruled the holding in Timmons, which had
found a five block car ride to be "brief and incidental" movement to
the robbery, failing the first prong of Daniels.52 The Earley court re-
pudiated language in previous decisions suggesting that "movement is
not 'merely incidental' to a robbery where the movement is 'necessary'
or 'essential' to the commission of the robbery or an important part of
[the defendant's] criminal objective."53 Rather, Earley reinterpreted
"incidental" under Daniels to mean "brief" movements which facili-
tate robbery, or robbery and rape, as contrasted with movements of a
"substantial" distance that facilitate the underlying crimes. 4 Citing
earlier cases, the court characterized as "brief' and consequently "in-
cidental", movements of twenty-five feet from a road to a field,55 thirty
to forty feet from one room to another in a business establishment,56
five to thirty feet within the victim's home, and movement around a
gas station's premises.57 In contrast, Earley held that asportation of
ten to thirteen blocks was clearly "substantial" within the meaning of
the first prong of Daniels.58
50. Id. at 126, 534 P.2d at 724, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 884.
51. See id. at 129, 534 P.2d at 726, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 886.
52. Id. at 131, 534 P.2d at 727, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 887 (which found a five block car ride to be
sufficient movement).
53. Id. at n.1 1. The Earley decision also acknowledged that one definition of "incidental"
according to WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (3d ed.) is "non-essential," but
asserted that it manifestly was not the sense in which the word was used in Daniels. Id.
54. Id. at 129-30, 534 P.2d at 726, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 886.
55. See, e.g., Stanworth, 11 Cal. 3d at 588, 522 P.2d at 1058, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 250 (1974).
56. See, eg., People v. Mutch, 4 Cal. 3d 389, 397-99, 482 P.2d 633, 638-39, 93 Cal. Rptr.
721, 726-27 (1971).
57. See, eg., Williams, 2 Cal. 3d at 902, 471 P.2d at 1013, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 213.
58. In re Earley, 14 Cal. 3d at 130, 534 P.2d at 721, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 886. To support its
holding, the court cited Thornton, 11 Cal. 3d at 747, 750, 767-68, 523 P.2d at 267, 114 Cal. Rptr.
467 (movements of victims one and four blocks are sufficient); Stanworth, 11 Cal. 3d at 603, 522
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Earley, therefore, rejected the definition of "incidental" advanced
by the California Supreme Court earlier in Timmons. The court's new
decision interpreted Daniels' first prong to preclude prosecution for
aggravated kidnapping only if the victim's asportation is very brief.
This appears consistent with the asportation requirement of more than
slight or insubstantial movement for simple kidnapping, which was
imposed by Stansworth when the court held the Daniels test inapplica-
ble to simple kidnapping. 19
Earley also reinterpreted the second prong of the Daniels test
which requires that the asportation in cases of aggravated kidnapping
substantially increase the risk of harm over and above that necessarily
present in the underlying crime. The court made clear how easily the
"risk of harm" test is satisfied by stating that whenever the victim is
forced to travel under the threat of imminent injury by a deadly
weapon there is the requisite "risk of harm." The court also held that
the "risk of harm" test could be satisfied in the absence of a deadly
weapon under certain circumstances, such as those in Earley. The
court found that in Earley, the forced asportation in the automobile
"gave rise to dangers, not inherent in robbery, that an auto accident
might occur or that the victim might attempt to escape from the mov-
ing car or be pushed therefrom by Earley."6
Unlike its analysis of Daniels' first prong, the court did not repu-
diate Timmons, but attempted to distinquish the facts in Earley from
Timmons, by noting that in Earley the increased risk of an accident
was greater since the asportation was ten to thirteen blocks rather than
just five blocks as in Timmons.61 Furthermore, in Timmons it was the
victim rather than the defendant who was driving. The Earley court
reasoned, therefore, that the defendant's attention to driving was dis-
tracted by his need to watch the victim. 62 The court also noted the
defendant in Earley was driving at night while wearing sunglasses,
rather than in the day as in Timmons, and proceeded from a lighted
intersection to a dark side street.63 In addition, the Earley court ob-
served that, unlike in Timmons, the victim was unaccompanied and
believed a gun was being pointed at him, presumably increasing the
P.2d at 1058, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 250 (one-quarter mile is sufficient); and People v. Stephenson, 10
Cal. 3d 652, 657, 661, 517 P.2d 820, 111 Cal. Rptr. 556 (1974) (five or six blocks is sufficient).
59. See supra notes 48-57 and accompanying text.
60. In re Earley, 14 Cal. 3d at 131-32, 534 P.2d at 727-28, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 887-88.
61. Id. at 133, 531 P.2d at 728, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 888.
62. Id.
63. Id.
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risk of a dangerous escape attempt by the victim.6
Consequently, these factual distinctions between Timmons and
Earley justified to the plurality of three justices a finding of "increased
risk" under the second prong of Daniels. 65 Two concurring justices in
Earley were unimpressed by the factual distinctions and would have
overruled Timmons entirely.66
The Daniels two prong test remains the law in California for ag-
gravated kidnapping. However, after Earley, it is satisfied by minimal
asportation so long as there is increased risk associated with the aspor-
tation. An unarmed robbery conducted after a forced ride around the
block may, therefore, constitute aggravated kidnapping, if the driver is
sufficiently distracted or impaired so as to increase the risk of an auto-
mobile accident, or there is sufficient risk of an imprudent escape at-
tempt by the victim. The Earley court did, however, reaffirm an
earlier holding67 that "acts of removing the victim from public view do
not in themselves substantially increase the risk of harm within our
rule in Daniels," but added "such acts or similar ones remain a cir-
cumstance to be considered in determining whether the risk of harm
was substantially increased."
68
For simple kidnapping, asportation is sufficient so long as it is
neither "slight [nor] insubstantial. ' 69 Furthermore, California court
decisions have held movements as short as 700 yards on a college cam-
pus, 70 and in another instance movement of one block, to be "substan-
64. Id
65. Id at 132-33, 531 P.2d at 728, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 888.
66. Id at 133, 531 P.2d at 729, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 889 (Clark, J. and McComb, J., con-
curring).
67. See In re Crompton, 9 Cal. 3d at 463, 507 P.2d at 74, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 770 (1973). See
supra note 42.
68. In re Earley, 14 Cal. 3d at 122 n. 15, 534 P.2d at 729 n.15, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 881 n.15
(quoting In re Crompton, 9 Cal. 3d at 467, 507 P.2d at 76, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 772). See supra note
42.
For a unique approach to kidnapping, fairly consistent in results with In re Earley, see State
v. Garcia, 288 Or. 413, 605 P.2d 671 (1980). In Garcia, the Oregon Supreme Court interpreted
its current kidnapping statutes by reviewing the statutes' legislative history. As was done in In re
Earley, the Oregon court flatly rejected asportation "incidental" to an underlying crime as a basis
for kidnapping, and indicated that moving a victim "a substantial distance" would be sufficient to
establish the offense. Id. at 420-21, 605 P.2d at 675-76. However, the Oregon court held that if
an offender had the "intent to interfere substantially" with a victim's personal liberty, he could be
guilty of kidnapping even if there was no such interference. Id. at 421, 605 P.2d at 676. Appar-
ently, under Garcia if a person intends to forcibly move someone a "substantial distance" (three
miles, for example) he may be convicted of kidnapping, even if he is thwarted by police after
moving the victim several feet.
69. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
70. See Apo, 25 Cal. App. 3d at 794, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 245. See supra note 41.
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tial."T While California has not gone entirely full circle since Cotton
first overruled decisions that any asportation could constitute kidnap-
ping, the court now holds that any asportation exceeding brief move-
ment is sufficient for simple kidnapping. Furthermore, the "increased
risk" requirement for aggravated kidnapping can be met relatively eas-
ily by statistical risks of automobile accidents or escape attempts far
short of situations constituting reckless driving.
In ight of the minimal asportation imposed as a precondition to a
finding of simple or aggravated kidnapping in California, it is doubtful
the California courts have accomplished what they have sought since
Cotton: to define kidnapping in a manner which avoids having it co-
exist almost inevitably with many conventional assaults or robberies.
IV. NEW YORK APPROACH: LIMITING KIDNAPPING THROUGH
THE DEVELOPMENT OF A MERGER DOCTRINE
Through its case law, New York has developed a merger doctrine
to limit the kidnapping offense to what the courts have labeled "con-
ventional kidnapping."
In People v. Levy,72 a husband and wife were accosted in New
York City as they stopped their car in front of their residence. The
two victims were forced to ride in their own car while they were
robbed of jewelry and cash. The victims' ordeal lasted twenty minutes
and covered a distance of twenty-seven city blocks. The defendants
were convicted of two counts of kidnapping, two counts of robbery,
and of criminally possessing a pistol. In Levy, the New York Court of
Appeals viewed the essence of kidnapping as "asportation of a person
under restraint and compulsion."73 Acknowledging that the then cur-
rent New York kidnapping statute had been broadly drafted to liter-
ally encompass any type of restraint,74 the court noted the statutory
definition could "overrun" other crimes commonly accompanied by
involuntary restraint-rape, robbery, and assault.7 The court con-
cluded the state legislature did not intend to include as kidnapping
those restraints incidental to other crimes, even though under a literal
statutory interpretation they would constitute kidnapping.
71. Thornton, 11 Cal. 3d at 747, 767-768, 523 P.2d at 267, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 467.
72. 15 N.Y.2d 159, 204 N.E.2d 812, 256 N.Y.S.2d 793 (1965).
73. Id. at 164, 204 N.E.2d at 843, 256 N.Y.S.2d at 795.
74. Id. The court quoted the New York statute as providing "that one who 'confines' an-
other with intent to 'cause him... to be confined' against his will is guilty of kidnapping." See
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1250 (McKinney 1967). This statute was later replaced by N.Y. PENAL
LAW §§ 135.20.25 (McKinney 1975), discussed infra in text accompanying notes 90-92.
75. Levy, 15 N.Y.2d at 164, 204 N.E.2d at 844, 256 N.Y.S.2d at 796.
HeinOnline -- 13 Am. J. Crim. L.  15 1985-1986
AM. J. CRIM. LAW
The Court of Appeals in Levy expressly overruled an earlier deci-
sion in People v. Florio,76 which upheld a kidnapping conviction in
which the victim was forcibly detained in an automobile and driven
from Manhattan to Queens where she was raped and assaulted. The
court in Levy limited the application of the New York kidnapping stat-
ute to "kidnapping in the conventional sense in which that term has
now come to have acquired meaning.' '" It concluded that although
the kidnapping statutory language might literally apply, the moving
automobile was merely the situs of the robbery; therefore, the crime
was merely robbery and not kidnapping.78 The Levy court, however,
did not explain what was meant by kidnapping "in the conventional
sense."
In People v. Lombardi,79 the defendant was accused of transport-
ing three young women from Manhattan to Queens, after he deceived
them into taking a drug that inhibited their ability to resist his subse-
quent sexual assaults. The defendant was convicted of kidnapping, at-
tempted rape, assault, and attempted assault.
As in Levy, the New York Court of Appeals acknowledged that
the asportation of the three young women fell literally within the kid-
napping statute.8° Nevertheless, the court observed that the asporta-
tion from one city borough to another played "no significant role in
the crime."81 The court then reversed the conviction for kidnapping
and ordered the kidnapping indictment dismissed.
In People v. Miles,82 the defendants attempted to kill the victim
with an injection of lye solution. The defendants then transported the
victim in the trunk of their car, first to another location in New Jersey
and then to New York, with the apparent intent to dispose of the vic-
83tim's remains.
The Court of Appeals rejected the defendants' argument that the
"Levy-Lombardi" rule precluded conviction for kidnapping, since the
76. Id. (citing People v. Florio, 301 N.Y. 46, 92 N.E.2d 881 (1950)).
77. Id. at 164-65, 204 N.E.2d at 844, 256 N.Y.S.2d at 796.
78. Id. at 165, 204 N.E.2d at 844, 256 N.Y.S.2d at 796.
79. 20 N.Y.2d 266, 229 N.E.2d 206, 282 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1967).
80. Id at 270, 229 N.E.2d at 208, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 521-22.
81. Id. The court noted that the defendant could have drugged the victims and attempted
to rape them behind his store and indeed speculated that bringing his victims to a public motel in
daylight, "thus inviting the possible risk of inquiry," was a less certain way of achieving his
purpose. Id. at 271, 229 N.E.2d at 208, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 522.
82. 23 N.Y.2d 527, 245 N.E.2d 688, 297 N.Y.S.2d 913, cert. denied, 395 U.S. 948 (1969).
83. The Court of Appeals determined that the jury could have found that, during the trans-
port of the victim, the defendant believed the victim was alive. Id. at 538, 245 N.E.2d at 694, 297
N.Y.S.2d at 921.
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asportation was simply ancillary to the attempted murder.84 The
court concluded without explanation that in the Levy and Lombardi
cases, unlike in Miles, the "restraint and asportation" were necessary
parts of the robbery or rape ultimately committed.8 5
The Court of Appeals added the Levy-Lombardi rule "has no
purpose of ignoring as independent crimes alternative or optional
means used in committing another crime which, by the gravity and
even horrendousness of the means used, constitute and should consti-
tute a separately cognizable offense." 6 The court failed, however, to
explain why the asportation, particularly in Lombardi, from one bor-
ough to another, was necessary to the attempted rape while the trans-
portation in Miles was not necessary to the attempted murder.
The Miles decision also concluded that the Levy-Lombardi rule
was not designed to "exclude from 'traditional' or 'conventional' kid-
napping, abduction designed to effect extortions or accomplish mur-
der.""7 Rather, the concern in Levy was to avoid "elevating ordinary
robberies, rapes, and assaults into the much more serious crime of kid-
napping ....
Since in Miles the abduction and asportation was designed to fa-
cilitate murder, the Court of Appeals found that the Levy-Lombardi
rule did not apply. 9 In light of this reasoning in Miles, it remains
uncertain whether the New York court would invalidate, under any
circumstances, any kidnapping convictions accompanying murder or
extortion provided the technical requirements of some seizure and as-
portation occurred.
In 1967, New York revised its kidnapping laws dividing kidnap-
ping into first and second degree offenses.90 The new statute severely
limited first degree kidnapping. The offense was restricted to "the
classic crime of kidnapping for ransom and its equivalents" and other
specified instances when the abduction lasts more than 12 hours or the
victim dies during the abduction.91 The statute allowed second degree
kidnapping to exist wherever a person "abducts another person. "92
84. Id. at 539, 245 N.E.2d at 694, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 921.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 539, 245 N.E.2d at 694, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 922.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 540, 245 N.E.2d at 694, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 922. Indeed, the New York Court of
Appeals observed that "it is the rare kidnapping that is an end in itself; almost invariably there is
another ultimate crime." Id. at 540, 245 N.E.2d at 695, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 922.
89. Id. at 540, 245 N.E.2d at 695, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 922-23.
90. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 135.20, 135.25 (McKinney 1975).
91. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 135.25 (McKinney 1975).
92. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 135.20 (McKinney 1975).
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The breadth of this second degree statute continued to raise what the
New York court characterized as a "merger" issue-would an abduc-
tion perpetrated during the commission of another offense (e.g., rape
or robbery) separately constitute the kidnapping offense?
The New York Court of Appeals addressed this question in
People v. Cassidy.9 3 In Cassidy, the defendant grabbed a woman and
dragged her at knifepoint 70 feet into a garage, where he sexually as-
saulted her. After the victim lost consciousness, the defendant de-
parted. He was convicted of assault, attempted sexual abuse, and
kidnapping in the second degree.
In Cassidy, the court explained its kidnapping merger doctrine:
The merger doctrine ... [is] based on an aversion to prose-
cuting a defendant on a kidnapping charge in order to expose
him to the heavier penalty thereby made available, where the
period of abduction was brief, the criminal enterprise in its
entirety appeared as no more than an offense of robbery or
rape and there was lacking a genuine "kidnapping" flavor
... True it is that the 12-hour durational requirement of
[first degree kidnapping] effectively renders the merger doc-
trine unnecessary with respect to prosecution [for that of-
fense]. We find nothing . . . however, which compels the
conclusion that the legislature [intended] ... to eliminate
[the merger doctrine] with respect to prosecutions for kid-
napping in the second degree... 4
The Cassidy court held the defendant's abduction of his victim
was "incidental" to the commission of the crimes of assault and at-
tempted sexual abuse.95 As a result, the merger doctrine precluded
the defendant's conviction for second degree kidnapping.96 The court
observed that the merger doctrine was intended "to preclude convic-
tion for kidnapping based on acts which are so much the part of an-
other substantive crime that the substantive crime could not have been
committed without such acts and that independent criminal responsi-
bility may not be fairly attributed to them." 97
Based on Cassidy, the New York Supreme Court Appellate Divi-
sion, in People v. Spinks,98 reversed a second degree kidnapping con-
viction under New York's new kidnapping statute, holding that "the
'kidnapping' was merely an element of a burglary designed to prevent
93. 40 N.Y.2d 763, 358 N.E.2d 870, 390 N.Y.S.2d 45 (1976).
94. Id. at 765-66, 358 N.E.2d at 872, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 47.
95. Id. at 768, 358 N.E.2d at 873, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 48.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 767, 358 N.E.2d at 873, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 47.
98. 58 A.D. 659, 395 N.Y.S.2d 709 (1977).
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the victims from notifying the police, thereby thwarting the bur-
glary."9 9 The failure to sustain the kidnapping conviction in Spinks is
particularly interesting in light of the significant asportation and con-
finement of the victims. The defendants not only confined the victims
in the course of robbing their home and store, but also ordered them at
gunpoint to travel in the victims' own car to a wooded area. After
they arrived, the victims were tied to a tree and their car was taken by
the gunman. Although these facts were not sufficient to sustain a kid-
napping conviction in New York, such facts clearly would be sufficient
asportation to constitute both simple and aggravated kidnapping
under California's current requirements. 10
Nevertheless, in New York after Cassidy and Spinks, what consti-
tutes sufficient asportation for second degree kidnapping to exist in
conjunction with a robbery, assault or rape charge remains a question.
There is also a question whether, in light of Miles, a kidnapping charge
could ever be dismissed when connected with a murder or extortion
charge. Although the New York decisions provide some guidance on
the direction of the New York kidnapping statute through the adop-
tion of a merger doctrine, the ultimate definitional direction remains
unclear. It is evident, however, that New York and California ap-
proaches will yield different results from the same fact setting.
V. THE MICHIGAN APPROACH: FORMULATING FACTORS TO
MEASURE ASPORTATION INCIDENTAL TO KIDNAPPING
If California can be faulted for formulating definitions of kidnap-
ping which have evolved almost full circle to the original asportation
requirement of only very minimal linear movement, Michigan's fault
lies in the development of a standard which almost defies comprehen-
sion. In People v. Adams,"'1 the victim, a prison official, was seized
inside a state prison by inmates. These inmates, including the defend-
ant, moved the victim from one part of the prison to another. The
Michigan Court of Appeals noted that prison guards knew the exact
location of both the defendant and the victim at all times. 10 2 There
was no attempt to effect an escape and the court characterized the
events as neither "the usual hostage pattern," nor "the usual kidnap-
99. Id. at 660, 395 N.Y.S.2d at 711.
100. Id. Clearly, California requires only minimal movement of the victim and, in addition,
some increased risk for aggravated kidnapping. See supra notes 49-71.
101. 34 Mich. App. 546, 192 N.W.2d 19 (1971), rev'd, 389 Mich. 222, 205 N.W.2d 415
(1973).
102. 34 Mich. App. at 551, 192 N.W.2d at 21.
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ping pattern." ' 3 The prison official was compelled to accompany the
defendants and other inmates to the hospital within the prison com-
pound. After five and one half hours, the defendant and his cohorts
agreed to surrender.
The Michigan Court of Appeals quoted the "relevant" portion of
the state's kidnapping statute1" which makes it "unlawful to 'will-
fully, maliciously and without lawful authority.., forcibly or secretly
confine or imprison any other person within this state against his
will."1 5 The Court of Appeals noted Michigan's kidnapping statute,
like most other states', would be too "all-encompassing" in its "literal
breadth" unless it were confined "by objective standards."'
10 6
Although "carrying away" of the victim was not specified by the stat-
ute, the Michigan court concluded asportation or, alternatively, con-
finement in a secret location, should be required for a kidnapping
conviction under this statute.1 07
In contrast to the approach taken by the California courts, the
Michigan Court of Appeals rejected efforts to calculate the "requisite
asportation in terms of linear measurement." 10 8 The court concluded
the actual distance the victim is moved does not "correspond" with
the invasion of his physical interest.109 The Court of Appeals held:
[U]nder the kidnapping statute a movement of the victim
does not constitute an asportation unless it has significance
independent of the assault. And unless the victim is re-
moved from the environment where he is found, the conse-
quences of the movement itself to the victim are not
independently significant from the assault-the movement
does not manifest the commission of a separate crime-and
punishment for injury to the victim must be founded upon
103. Id. at 552, 192 N.W.2d at 21. During this time, prison officials visited the defendant
and other inmates, while a reporter recorded grievances.
104. The Michigan kidnapping statute provides:
[a]ny person who willfully, maliciously and without lawful authority shall forcibly or
secretly confine or imprison any other person within this state against his will, or shall
forcibly carry or send such person out of this state, or shall forcibly seize or confine, or
shall inveigle or kidnap any other person with intent to extort money or other valuable
thing thereby or with intent either to cause such person to be secretly confined or im-
prisoned in this state against his will, or in any way held to service against his will, shall
be guilty of a felony, punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for life or for any
term of years.
MicH. CoMP. LAws § 750.349 (1968).
105. 34 Mich. App. at 549-50, 192 N.W.2d at 20.
106. Id at 550, 192 N.W.2d at 21.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 568, 192 N.W.2d at 30.
109. Id.
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crimes other than kidnapping. 11°
The Court of Appeals explained that by the term "environment,"
it did not mean "mere geographic location [which] would be to return
to the 'any movement' concept," but "the totality of the surroundings,
animate and inanimate." ' The vagueness of the Michigan Court of
Appeals's change of environment rule was underscored by the court's
own stated uncertainty of what would constitute kidnapping under its
new test in the context of street assaults and robberies.
112
Applying its change of environment test to the facts in Adams,
the Michigan Court of Appeals concluded that the crime of kidnap-
ping had not been committed and the conviction should be reversed.
As the victim's duties required him to move through the entire prison
environment, the asportation to the fifth floor prison hospital was held
not to be independently significant.113 The court found the purpose of
the movement was not to avoid detection or expose the victim to an
increased risk of harm, nor was it to make a rescue more difficult. The
victims, the court noted, had suggested moving to the gymnasium
away from the fracas to discuss the prison disorder, but were instead
compelled to move to the hospital. Consequently, the court con-
cluded that the movement had "[no] significance adverse" to the vic-
tim "independent of the continuing assault." 114
The Michigan Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals in
Adams and rejected the lower court's proposed "change of environ-
ment" test for kidnapping. 5 Instead, the Michigan Supreme Court
articulated six factors to determine whether the kidnapping statute
would be applicable:
(1) Since the language of the first part of the kidnapping
statute by itself is so general as to be susceptible of defining
minor crimes as well as kidnapping, where appropriate, as-
portation must be interpolated to achieve the Legislature's
intention to define the major crime of kidnapping. (2) The
movement element is not sufficient if it is "merely inciden-
tal" to the commission of another underlying lesser crime.
(3) If the underlying crime involves murder, extortion or tak-
110. Id.
111. Id. at 569, 192 N.W.2d at 30.
112. Id. at 571 n.39, 192 N.W.2d at 31-32 n.39.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 571, 192 N.W.2d at 31.
115. People v. Adams, 389 Mich. 222, 239-42, 205 N.W.2d 415, 423-24. The Michigan
Supreme Court also criticized the California requirement imposed by Daniels that "the asporta-
tion must substantially increase the risk that the victim may suffer significant physical injuries
over and above those to which a victim of the underlying crime is normally exposed." Id. at 235,
205 N.W.2d at 421. See Daniels, 71 Cal. 2d at 119, 59 P.2d at 225, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 897.
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ing a hostage, movement incidental thereto is generally suffi-
cient to establish a valid statutory kidnapping. (4) If the
movement adds either a greater danger or threat thereof,
that is a factor in considering whether the movement ade-
quately constitutes the necessary legal asportation, but there
could be asportation without this element of additional dan-
ger so long as the movement was incidental to a kidnapping
and not a lesser crime. (5) Where appropriate, secret con-
finement or some other non-movement factor may supply a
necessary alternative to asportation to complete statutory
kidnapping. (6) Whether or not a particular movement con-
stitutes statutory asportation or whether there is an appro-
priate alternative element must be determined from all the
circumstances under the standards set out above and is a
question of fact for the jury.116
The Michigan Supreme Court rejected the Appellate Court's as-
sumption that the asportation in Adams was not independent of the
lesser crime of assault.11 7 The court speculated that the asportation
could have related to the crime of false imprisonment, the crime of
kidnapping, or as the lower court concluded, only the crime of assault.
The Michigan Supreme Court noted "it might be difficult for the jury
to find that the assault element constituted the real crime as there was
no apparent motive for the assault in the sense of acting to harm [the
victim]. 118
The Michigan Supreme Court suggested it would be more diffi-
cult to determine if the movement was related to the crime of false
imprisonment or kidnapping since both crimes shared "essentially
common elements." ' 9 The Michigan Supreme Court referred, how-
ever, to the concept advanced by the New York Court of Appeals that
"traditional or 'conventional' kidnapping focus[es] on extortion, mur-
der or taking hostage[s]." 1 20 Consequently, in determining the na-
ture of the confinement, the court concluded the jury must be
permitted to weigh the evidence to determine whether the confinement
relates "more to confinement for the sake of confinement," suggesting
the crime of false imprisonment; or confinement "for the sake of as-
sault," suggesting the crime of assault; or confinement for the sake of
"extortion, murder or taking a hostage," which would indicate the
crime of kidnapping under the Michigan Supreme Court's standard. 121
116. Adams, 389 Mich. at 238, 205 N.W.2d at 422-23 (emphasis added).
117. Id. at 239, 205 N.W.2d at 423.
118. Id. at 240, 205 N.W.2d at 423.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 240-41, 205 N.W.2d at 424.
121. Id. at 241, 205 N.W.2d at 424.
Vol. 13:1 (1985)
HeinOnline -- 13 Am. J. Crim. L.  22 1985-1986
Kidnapping
In the Adams case, the Michigan Supreme Court reversed the
Court of Appeals, holding it was possible for the jury to have con-
cluded that the confinement and asportation of the victim was for the
purpose of extorting redress for grievances. This constitutes kidnap-
ping under factor three of the Michigan Supreme Court standard,
since "[i]f the underlying crime involves murder, extortion or taking
hostages, movement incidental thereto is generally sufficient to estab-
lish a valid statutory kidnapping."
' 122
In People v. Barker, 123 the Michigan Supreme Court reviewed a
trial court's charge that "the asportation element of kidnapping would
be satisfied if the jury found the movement of the victim to be inciden-
tal to the commission of the underlying coequal offense of first-degree
criminal sexual conduct."1 2 4 The Michigan Supreme Court noted that
in Adams, it had expressly held in factor two of its standard that the
asportation element in kidnapping "must not be merely incidental to
the commission of a lesser underlying crime, i.e. it must be incidental
to the commission of the kidnapping.
125
The court in Barker clarified the new Michigan standard by hold-
ing that "to find guilt of kidnapping, it must be shown to be movement
having significance independent of any accompanying offense."126
The court, therefore, found reversible error in jury instructions per-
mitting the jury to find kidnapping when there was "movement either
for the purpose of kidnapping the victim or to commit the crime of
criminal sexual conduct .... ,27
The Michigan kidnapping standard, as enunciated in Adams and
Barker, fails to define adequately what constitutes asportation for the
purpose of kidnapping. In light of factor three in Adams, it is possible
to conclude that when extortion, murder, or hostage taking are in-
volved, kidnapping is automatically established whenever the slightest
122. Id.
123. 411 Mich. 291, 307 N.W.2d 61 (1981).
124. Id. at 295, 307 N.W.2d at 62 (emphasis added). "Coequal" is in reference to the length
of punishment mandated by the Michigan legislature for the offense. Id. n.1.
125. Id. at 299, 307 N.W.2d at 63 (emphasis added) (quoting People v. Adams, 389 Mich. at
236, 205 N.W.2d at 422).
126. Id. at 300, 307 N.W.2d at 64.
127. Id. at 301, 307 N.W.2d at 64. Justice Kavanagh, who concurred in Adams, announced
in a concurring decision that he now felt Adams had been wrongly decided. Adams read in the
element of asportation to save the Michigan kidnapping statute from overbreadth. Justice Kava-
nagh argued no element of asportation should be read into the statute. Instead, he believed the
second portion of the Michigan kidnapping statute should be read with the first portion to re-
quire for non-interstate asportation an intent to extort, to secretly confine, or to cause the victim
to be held to service against his will.
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asportation occurs."8 Yet, making kidnapping an automatic accom-
panying crime in virtually every murder would appear particularly
problematic in establishing a useful identity to the crime. Further-
more, although the Michigan Supreme Court in Barker did not ex-
pressly address factor three in Adams, its discussion of factor two in
Adams indicates an unwillingness to find kidnapping where the aspor-
tation was "incidental" to another crime and not incidental to the kid-
napping itself. Thus, what constitutes kidnapping in Michigan
remains very uncertain in light of a circular standard which defines
"kidnapping" by requiring asportation "incidental to kidnapping." '129
VI. THE KANSAS APPROACH: REQUIRING ASPORTATION WHICH
SUBSTANTIALLY FACILITATES ANOTHER CRIME
The Kansas Supreme Court, in State v. Buggs,130 has expressly
rejected the current California, New York, and Michigan approaches
to defining kidnapping. Instead, it has rested its approach on the par-
ticular language of the Kansas penal code.
1 3 1
The Kansas Supreme Court noted that while much of the state's
statutory language is borrowed from the Model Penal Code, the kid-
napping statute, unlike the Model Penal Code, does not require that
the victim be removed "from his place of residence or business or a
substantial distance," 32 but merely requires a "taking" or a "confin-
ing." 13 3 In light of this statutory language, the Kansas court con-
strued its kidnapping statute as "requiring no particular distance of
128. The third factor in Adams states that "if the underlying crime involves murder, extor-
tion, or taking a hostage, movement incidental thereto is generally sufficient to establish a valid
statutory kidnapping." 389 Mich. at 238, 205 N.W.2d at 422, 423. See supra note 116 and
accompanying text.
129. Adams, 389 Mich. at 236, 205 N.W.2d at 422.
130. 219 Kan. 203, 547 P.2d 720 (1976).
131. The Kansas kidnapping statute, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3420 (1981), provides:
Kidnapping is the taking or confining of any person, accomplished by force, threat or
deception, with the intent to hold such person:
(a) For ransom, or as a shield or hostage; or
(b) To facilitate flight or the commission of any crime; or
(c) To inflict bodily injury or to terrorize the victim or another; or
(d) To interfere with the performance of any governmental or political function.
132. MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.1 (1980).
133. Buggs, 219 Kan. at 213, 547 P.2d at 730. The court observed that the "unembellished"
language of the Kansas statute is borrowed from the New Mexico kidnapping statute. Id. The
New Mexico kidnapping statute, § 40A-4-1 provides:
Kidnap[p]ing is the unlawful taking, restraining, or confining of a person, by force or
deception, with intent that the victim: (1) be held for ransom; or (2) as a hostage,
confined against his will; or (3) be held to service against the victim's will.
The statute is presently set forth in N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-4-1 (1978).
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removal, nor any particular time or place of confinement." '134
Nevertheless, the court felt compelled to qualify this broad con-
clusion, because "a kidnapping statute is not reasonably intended to
cover movements and confinements which are slight and merely inci-
dental to the commission of an underlying lesser crime."1 35 The court
noted the Kansas statute required the possible taking or confinement
to be executed with the specific intent to accomplish one of four enu-
merated objectives. The court characterized the first enumerated ob-
jective, that of holding a victim for ransom or as a shield or hostage, as
the recognized "classic" or "pure" form of kidnapping and confine-
ment for such purposes "supplies a necessary alternative" to asporta-
tion in much the same way that the commission of a felony supplies a
necessary alternative to premeditation in a first degree murder
charge. 136
The Kansas Supreme Court did, however, express "concern"
with the second type of intent where the victim is seized "to facilitate
... the commission of any crime. ' 137 Relying on dictionary defini-
tions of "facilitate" meaning "to make easier or less difficult .... "138
the court concluded that the word suggests more than "just to make
more convenient," but instead requires that the taking or confining
must have "some significant bearing on making the commission of the
crime 'easier,' as, for example, by lessening the risk of detection."
1 39
The court, therefore, mandated a distinction between a taking
which is "merely incidental" to another crime and one which "sub-
stantially facilitates it" and which would therefore constitute kidnap-
ping. The court held that in order for a kidnapping defendant to be
properly charged, the taking or confinement done to facilitate the
commission of another crime:
(a) Must not be slight, inconsequential and merely inciden-
tal to the other crime;
(b) Must not be of the kind inherent in the nature of the
other crime; and
(c) Must have some significance independent of the other crime
in that it makes the other crime substantially easier of commis-
sion or substantially lessens the risk of detection.4
134. Buggs, 219 Kan. at 214, 547 P.2d at 730.
135. Id. at 215, 547 P.2d at 730.
136. Id. at 214, 547 P.2d at 730.
137. Id.
138. Id. (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcTIONARY (4th ed. 1976)).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 216, 547 P.2d at 731. The Kansas Supreme Court offered examples as to what
would constitute kidnapping. Included under the court's standard would be the forced removal
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Applying its standard to the facts in Buggs, the Kansas court held
that the conduct of the defendants constituted kidnapping under the
statute. 14 1 In Buggs, the victims were accosted in the parking lot of
the store where they worked. Although one of the victims had the
day's receipts with her and could have been robbed immediately, both
victims were forced to return to the store. The court, therefore,
concluded:
The movement, slight though it was, substantially reduced
the risk of detection not only of the robbery but of [the sub-
sequent] rape [of one of the two victims]. Except in the mat-
ter of distance, which we are holding to be irrelevant, it was
as if the defendant had seized the [victims] at home and
forced them to return to the store before the robbery and
rape. 
142
Thus, the Kansas Supreme Court required that to find kidnap-
ping the asportation or confinement must be intended to significantly
facilitate a crime by substantially limiting the possibility of detection
or apprehension. In contrast, since California expressly rejected
movement to avoid detection as the sole basis to find the increased risk
of harm required by its aggravated kidnapping statute under Daniels'
second prong, 143 the facts in Buggs would probably fail the California
standard for aggravated kidnapping. The facts in Buggs would only
satisfy California's simple kidnapping standard if the actual linear as-
portation exceeded what the California courts would characterize as
more than "slight" or "insubstantial," with a distance of thirty feet
labeled "brief," but a block as sufficient to constitute kidnapping
under California case law.
In Kansas, the distance in Buggs, which was less than a block but
possibly more than thirty feet, is criminologically insignificant. In
contrast, under California's simple kidnapping statute linear distance
appears to be the only factor. Under New York's standard, it is highly
unlikely in light of Cassidy'" and Spinks145 that such asportation ac-
companying a robbery or rape, as opposed to murder, would be suffi-
of a victim to a dark alley or from any public place to a place of seclusion. This would include
removing a store clerk to a closet to facilitate escape, but exclude the forced movement of a clerk
across the store to open the cash register or the removal of a rape victim from room to room in a
dwelling "solely for the convenience and comfort of the rapist."
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. See supra note 37.
144. 40 N.Y.2d at 763, 358 N.E.2d at 870, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 45. See supra notes 93-97 and
accompanying text.
145. 58 A.D.2d at 659, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 709. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
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cient to constitute kidnapping.146
Indeed, the facts in Buggs, movement from outside to inside a
store, underscore how readily the Kansas court is prepared to charac-
terize routine robberies as kidnapping. Potentially, any movement
from one side of a street to another to reduce detection during the
course of an assault or robbery can constitute asportation justifying
prosecution under Kansas' kidnapping statute. Although the Kansas
court labels such movement more than merely "incidental," to many it
would appear to be just that.147
VII. THE MODEL PENAL CODE APPROACH
The Model Penal Code, adopted by the American Law Institute,
formulated its definition of kidnapping "to effect a major restructuring
of the law of kidnapping as it existed at the time the Model Code was
drafted."' 48 The introductory note to the provision observes that
"many prior kidnapping statutes combined severe sanctions with ex-
traordinarily broad coverage, to the effect that relatively trivial re-
straints carried sanctions of death or life imprisonment." 149
Section 212.1 defines kidnapping as follows:
A person is guilty of kidnapping if he unlawfully removes
another from his place of residence or business, or a substan-
tial distance from the vicinity where he is found, or if he
unlawfully confines another for a substantial period in a
place of isolation, with any of the following purposes: (a) to
hold for ransom or reward, or as a shield or hostage; or (b)
to facilitate commission of any felony or flight thereafter; or
(c) to inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the victim or
another; or (d) to interfere with the performance of any gov-
146. See supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text. See also Spinks, supra notes 98-99, where
the defendants moved the victims a significant distance by car to a wooded area and then tied
them to a tree.
147. Florida, which has adopted the Buggs kidnapping test, has been very liberal in its appli-
cation of the factors. In one Florida Supreme Court case, the movement of an assault victim
from a kitchen to a bedroom was found to meet the test. See Faison v. State, 426 So. 2d 963, 966
(1983).
Another jurisdiction, Rhode Island, has gone a step beyond Kansas' facilitation requirement
holding that to constitute kidnapping, "any movement of a victim during the course of a crime"
must exceed that "necessary to facilitate the crimes at hand." State v. Innis, 433 A.2d 646, 655
(1981). In application, however, the Rhode Island approach approximates the Kansas require-
ment, since unlike Kansas, Rhode Island conceives "facilitating" conduct to be synonymous with
"incidental" conduct. See State v. Lambert, 463 A.2d 1333, 1340 (1983), State v. Ballard, 439
A.2d 1375, 1386-87 (1982), State v. Innis, 433 A.2d 646, 655 (1981).
148. MODEL PENAL CODE art. 212, introductory note at 208 (1980).
149. Id.
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emmental or political function.15 °
The introductory note characterizes the standard as confining
kidnapping to "the most serious offenses [of] instances of substantial
removal or confinement."1 51
While the comment to the Model Penal Code notes "numerous
instances of abusive prosecution under expansive kidnapping statutes
for conduct that a rational and mature penal law would have treated
as another crime," the Institute nevertheless concluded that a valid
justification exists for retaining kidnapping as a distinct crime.15 2 The
Model Rule's commentary notes "[i]f the offense is confined to cases of
substantial isolation of the victim from his normal environment, it
punishes a frightening and dangerous form of aggression not ade-
quately dealt with elsewhere." '153
Ironically, the Model Penal Code' s specific responses fail to ade-
quately limit kidnapping to substantial isolation. The crime is retained
as "an aggravated felony," but the code's definition for kidnapping,
unlike the Institute's articulated intent, is insufficient to "restrict its
scope to cases of substantial removal or confinement for specified
purposes."
15 4
The Institute acknowledged difficulty in attempting to draft ap-
propriate standards. A draft defining the offense in terms of "substan-
tial isolation" by "declaring a person guilty of kidnapping if he
removes another to a place where he is isolated from the protection of
law or the aid of others. . ." was apparently revised "on the ground
that it might require proof that the victim had actually reached the
isolated place where the kidnapper meant to hold him." 5 Conse-
quently, while the Model Penal Code commentary recognizes that the
"core of the ... offense is substantial 'isolation' of the victim," the
language of the Code was altered to define the offense "in terms of
removing the victim 'from'. . . locations rather than transporting him
150. Id. at § 212.1. The provision continues:
Kidnapping is a felony of the first degree unless the actor voluntarily releases the victim
alive and in a safe place prior to trial, in which case it is a felony of the second degree.
A removal or confinement is unlawful within the meaning of this Section if it is accom-
plished by force, threat or deception, or, in the case of a person who is under the age of
14 or incompetent, if it is accomplished without the consent of a parent, guardian or
other person responsible for general supervision of his welfare.
The standard was initially presented and approved at the ALI proceedings in May 1960 and
approved as part of the proposed official draft in May 1962.
151. Id. at art. 212 introductory note at 208.
152. Id. at § 212.1 comment at 221-22.
153. Id. at § 212.1 comment at 222.
154. See id. at § 212.1 comment at 222-23 and discussion infra.
155. See id. at § 212.1 comment at 223.
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to a place of isolation."'' 5 6
The commentary to the Code asserts that its "phrasing of the as-
portation requirement eliminates the absurdity of liability for kidnap-
ping where a robber forces his victim into his own home or into the
back of a store in order to retrieve valuables located there." '57 The
commentary's observation is based on the Code's language requiring
removal of the victim "a substantial distance from the vicinity where
he is found" or "from his residence or place of business." '158
Consequently, any asportation from inside to outside a house or
business would be sufficient, so long as asportation was done with one
of the requisite purposes. These include "to facilitate commission of
any felony or flight thereafter," '59 no matter how slight the distance
involved. This appears inconsistent with the commentary's recognition
that the core of the offense is "substantial isolation"'16 of the victim.
Furthermore, the Code offers little guidance as to what constitutes
"substantial distance from the vicinity" when removal is not from the
victim's residence or place of business.1 61 The difficulties faced by the
courts, in the jurisdictions discussed above, demonstrate a failure to
articulate meaningful distinctions based on distances or even a consen-
sus on what "substantial distance" should mean.
In a more productive vein and underscoring the questionable util-
ity of the Code's use of asportation, is the Code's alternative require-
ment of confinement "for a substantial period in a place of
isolation."' 162 The commentary to the Code recognizes that kidnap-
ping should exist as a crime, even when there is no asportation "where
the victim is held in the place where he is found for a substantial pe-
riod of time."'' 63 It is recognition of these non-asportational factors
that provides the best possibility for coherently defining kidnapping.
The Code's strong reliance on asportation as an alternative to
time of confinement to establish kidnapping does little, however, to
resolve the complications faced by different jurisdictions that rely on




159. Id. at § 212.1.
160. Id. at § 212.1 comment at 223.
161. See id.
162. The Code addresses kidnapping in light of the following purposes of the unlawful deten-
tion: holding for ransom, facilitating a felony, inflicting bodily harm, or interfering with a gov-
ernmental function. MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.1. Such isolation, as with asportation, must be
in conjunction with one of the requisite purposes enumerated in the Code.
163. Id. at § 212.1 comment at 224.
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ture of the asportation necessary to transform one crime into the addi-
tional and, in many instances, far more serious crime of kidnapping.
VIII. TOWARD A MODERN DEFINITION OF KIDNAPPING
The New York Court of Appeals has observed: "[I]t is the rare
kidnapping that is an end in itself, almost inevitably there is another
ultimate crime.""' The courts' task in defining kidnapping as a sepa-
rate crime is identifying significant behavior or intent that warrants
additional and specific criminal sanction. While establishing different
standards and tests, none of the state courts have successfully utilized
the concept of asportation to determine when confinement should con-
stitute kidnapping. 65 In contrast, the Model Penal Code utilizes as-
portation only as an alternative basis to time for defining kidnapping,
recognizing that the "core of the.., offense is substantial 'isolation' of
the victim." 66 Substantial isolation, as the Model Penal Code'6 7 and
several of the state codes 6' acknowledge, does not require any aspor-
tation; consequently, time is considered an alternate basis for imposing
liability. Despite this progressive movement away from the asporta-
tion as the sole focus, courts continue to flounder in their efforts to
determine just how much asportation constitutes a sufficient harm to
justify prosecutions for kidnapping as an independent crime.
In its new first degree kidnapping statute, New York restricts lia-
bility to (1) "the classic crime of kidnapping for ransom and its
equivalents" and (2) other specified instances when the abduction lasts
for more than twelve hours or the victim dies during the abduction. 16 9
However, because New York recognizes a second degree kidnapping
without these requirements, 70 the New York courts confront the
same problems of defining the crime as other state courts face.'
71
Nevertheless, New York's recognition of time as a critical factor
in its first degree kidnapping statute constitutes the best solution for
reestablishing a workable and equitable definition for all forms of kid-
napping. Substantial isolation becomes a significant harm in itself, as
the length of detention continues and the harm of the false imprison-
164. Miles, 23 N.Y.2d at 540, 245 N.E.2d at 694, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 922.
165. See generally supra notes 13-147 and accompanying text (discussing the approaches to
kidnapping in California, Oregon, New York, Michigan, Kansas, Rhode Island, and Florida).
166. See MODEL PENAL CODE at § 212.1 and commentary at 223.
167. See id. at § 212.1.
168. See, eg., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 787.01 (West 1976 & Supp. 1984), KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-
3420 (1981), OR. REV. STAT. §§ 163.225-163.35 (1983), R.I. GEN. LAWs § 11-26-1 (1981).
169. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 135.25 (McKinney 1975).
170. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 135.20 (McKinney 1975).
171. See supra notes 87-94 and accompanying text.
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ment grows more severe. Thus, while almost every robbery, assault,
murder, and rape contains false imprisonment (in some, but not all,
jurisdictions a distinct but not severely punished crime172), it is inap-
propriate to define kidnapping, a serious felony, as a coextensive
crime. While the harm of these independent crimes can range from
comparatively minor assault 173 to rape 74 and murder, 171 it is the pain
of confinement that creates a distinct harm worthy of the independent
punishment for kidnapping. Once the injury being inflicted by any
accompanying crime is excluded, the length and condition of the con-
finement become the principle determinant in measuring the harm
which forms the basis for the kidnapping charge.
The initial common law element of carrying a victim out of the
country in the context of 17th century transportation and communica-
tion (when the crime of kidnapping emerged in English case law) 176
emphasized that the victim would almost inevitably suffer a very
lengthy, if not permanent, isolation from his or her normal society.
From this perspective, kidnapping was an extreme form of false im-
prisonment because the isolation was often for the duration of the vic-
tim's life.
Given that the isolation is the evil at which the crime of kidnap-
ping is aimed, it is proposed that kidnapping be determined by the
duration and quality of the confinement. 177 While consideration of the
172. For example, in California false imprisonment is "the unlawful violation of the personal
liberty of another." The maximum penalty for the basic offense is a $1000 fine and a one year jail
sentence. CAL. PENAL CODE § 208 (West 1970 & Supp. 1984). In contrast, the maximum pen-
alty for second degree kidnapping in California is seven years. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 208
( Vest Supp. 1984). See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.3 and PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 5,
at 224-229, which characterize false imprisonment as a very minor offense. But see CRIMINAL
LAW REVISION COMMITrEE, supra note 10, noting a sentence of life in prison was permitted in
England for commision of the offense of false imprisonment.
173. See, eg., Cotton, 56 Cal. 2d at 459, 364 P.2d at 241, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 65.
174. See, eg., Stanworth, 9 Cal. 3d at 463, 507 P.2d at 74, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 770.
175. See, eg., People v. Alcala, 36 Cal. 3d 604, 685 P.2d 1126, 205 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1984).
176. See supra note 9.
177. See, eg. comparable penal provisions in the FRENCH PENAL CODE, POLISH PENAL
CODE, and GREEK PENAL CODE, supra note 10. The emphasis on time is appropriate in measur-
ing isolation both from the perspective of the detained victim and the family and friends of the
victim. Consequently, this temporal approach measures harm directed at cognizant victims as
well as infants who are unaware of the criminal event. The MODEL PENAL CODE'S definition of
kidnapping states that "a removal or confinement is unlawful within the meaning of this section
if it is accomplished by force, threat or deception, or, in the case of a person who is under the age
of 14 or incompetent, if it is accomplished without the consent of a parent, guardian or other
person responsible for general supervision of his welfare." MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.1 (1980).
Some states have special child stealing statutes to complement the kidnapping laws. See
PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 5, at 234-36.
Thwarted efforts of confinements which could have been long enough to constitute kidnap-
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harshness of the surroundings, independent of inflicted crimes, is ap-
propriate when the charge is kidnapping, asportation for its own sake
should be unimportant.'78 Similarly, the severity of any other crime
being inflicted against the victim during the period of confinement
may make the same amount of time more or less painful and thus
would be an appropriate factor to consider.
Consequently, less time may be required to constitute kidnapping
when the time of confinement accompanies more serious offenses, such
as murder and rape. Also, less time may be required, if the environ-
ment of the confinement is otherwise particularly distressing. The em-
phasis must be on the length and quality of isolation because this is the
distinct harm that is being independently punished through the crime
of kidnapping.
A. Violent Crimes and Kidnappings
Under the proposed approach, the perpetrators of most robberies,
rapes, and murders could not be charged with the additional crime of
kidnapping. If however, the confinement significantly exceeded the
amount of time normally needed to complete such crimes, the experi-
ence of the confinement itself would be substantially aggravated be-
yond the false imprisonment that is necessary for the crime to be
committed. The confinement would no longer be the unfortunate by-
product of another crime or a minor infringement, but a serious impo-
sition of isolation from ordinary social interaction. Even short periods
of imprisonment, that do not exceed the normal confinement associ-
ated with an accompanying crime, may still be particularly tortious
and go beyond the ordinary victimization of the other crimes being
perpetrated against the detained individual.
Aggravating factors, such as a particularly distressful location or
physical or psychological torture not ordinarily inherent in the accom-
ping under this article's proposal would, of course, be punished as "attempted" kidnapping. For
a discussion of attempt, see W.R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW §§ 59-60 (1972).
178. See supra note 177. If kidnapping is viewed as an aggravated form of false imprison-
ment, it can be observed that the severity of judicially ordered imprisonment as punishment for
criminal convictions is measured by primarily the length of the sentence and secondarily by the
conditions at the confining penal institution. See generally, KADISH, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
PROCESSES 210-30, 1039-46, 1047-126 (4th ed. 1983); R. HOOD & R. SPARKS, KEY ISSUES IN
CRIMINOLOGY 141-170 (1970).
In a more extended analogy, the stealing of property requires an intent to permanently
deprive, and while asportation exists as a traditional element of larceny as well, it has been
justified merely as a basis to substantiate that intent. See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 223.0-223.9
(1980). Likewise, under the proposed approach to kidnapping, asportation would serve only as a
potentially aggravating factor of the quality of confinement or indicator of the defendant's intent
to confine the victim.
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panying crimes, should be considered sufficient to justify elevating or-
dinary false imprisonment into kidnapping because of the additional
pain and terror of the imprisonment. Undoubtedly, asportation in
some instances affects the quality of confinement and thus bears on
whether there is "substantial isolation," but it would not be a determi-
native factor.
It is understandable that the current New York and Michigan
approaches to kidnapping appear much more ready to characterize the
perpetrator's behavior as kidnapping in the context of a murder.
179
Confinement which subjects the victim to great violence can make
even short periods of imprisonment unbearable. In this sense, the
New York and Michigan tendencies to find kidnapping far more read-
ily in the context of murder are consistent within limits to the pro-
posed approach.
Since smaller incremental detention in intensely violent crimes
can quickly magnify the terror of the confinement, the aggravating
factors may more easily justify a finding of kidnapping in shorter peri-
ods than would be required in the context of other crimes. Neverthe-
less, it would be inappropriate to transform virtually any murder
automatically into kidnapping without an additional identifiable harm.
By limiting kidnapping to extended periods of isolation that at the
very least involve a quality or duration of imprisonment beyond that
inherent in other crimes, kidnapping can begin to regain its unique
identity.
B. Ransom and Hostage Kidnapping
Threats to third parties to continue to confine, injure, or kill a
detained victim constitute what New York calls the "classic" kidnap-
ping scenario. This combination of false imprisonment18 0 and extor-
tion1 81 creates special terror and apprehension to individuals beyond
the immediate victim of imprisonment. Consequently, this particular
combination of crimes should constitute kidnapping without any mini-
mal time of confinement. Instead, the threat not to return the impris-
oned victim safely automatically aggravates the potential conse-
quences of the false imprisonment and imposes at once the fear of per-
manent isolation.1 82 The combination of this form of extortion with
false imprisonment constitutes a distinct harm, which differs from
179. See Adams' third factor, supra notes 122, 128 and accompanying text; see also Miles,
supra notes 182-84 and accompanying text.
180. See supra note 7.
181. See PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 5 at 442-452; LAFAVE, supra note 178, at 704-707.
182. Napier, supra note 5.
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mere extortion, much like the combination of assault and larceny con-
stitutes the distinct harm of robbery."8 3 Confinement combined with
either assault, robbery, rape or murder, on the other hand, does not
alone constitute a distinct harm, since confinement and some asporta-
tion is almost inevitably entailed in the commission of these crimes.
Indeed, it is the classic ransom form of kidnapping that arguably
revitalized awareness of the crime, since it clearly constitutes an aggra-
vated form of false imprisonment in need of severe penalties and con-
demnation."8 4 While it has been argued that kidnapping be restricted
to this criminal scenario, l8 ' the need for an aggravated crime where
the false imprisonment results in severe isolation exists in other con-
texts. The threats in a "ransom" type kidnapping immediately aggra-
vate the injury of the isolation, however brief, but other situations
require a longer period of confinement to justify treating them as
kidnappings.
IX. CONCLUSION
The proposed approach to kidnapping does not eliminate ambigu-
ity in the definition of kidnapping. It does, however, argue against the
use of asportation as a basis for the definition of kidnapping. Instead,
courts should focus on whether the time and quality of the victim's
imprisonment justifies characterizing the confinement as kidnapping.
Ideally, kidnapping statutes should be amended to require that
either the duration of the victim's confinement or the harsh conditions
of the imprisonment exceed that normally inherent in any accompany-
ing crime. The perpetrators of assaults, robberies, rapes, and murders
should be punished appropriately for these crimes. The additional
characterization of such behavior as kidnapping, however, should be
limited to instances where the confinement of the victim, which is al-
most inevitably a part of these other crimes, imposes a significant addi-
tional harm.
Lengthy confinement beyond that normally associated with other
crimes should constitute kidnapping."8 6 In these instances, the dura-
183. See PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 5, at 245, 343; LAFAVE, supra note 178.
184. See Kanter, supra note 1, at 993; see generally, E.K. ALIX, supra note 1; MODEL PENAL
CODE § 212.1 (1980).
185. See Note, supra note 5, at 554-558.
186. I decline to propose a specific minimum duration of confinement, such as two hours, to
elevate ordinary false imprisonment into the more serious crime of kidnapping. Even relatively
short confinements can warrant the label of kidnapping if the conditions of confinement are
sufficiently harsh. The proposal does not preclude different degrees of kidnapping based on dura-
tion of confinement.
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tion of the imprisonment imposes an additional harm beyond the as-
sault or other crime directed against the victim. Kidnapping statutes
should also specify aggravating factors that will elevate relatively short
confinements to the crime of kidnapping. These factors should include
unusually harsh conditions of confinement or the infliction of physical
or psychological torture beyond that inherent in accompanying
crimes. The classic ransom demand constitutes an additional aggra-
vating factor, which immediately threatens permanent isolation and
therefore justifies automatically classifying the imprisonment as
kidnapping.
In the absence of legislative change, it is desirable that courts con-
strue current statutes, which are usually quite general in nature,187 as
focusing on the time and quality of confinement rather than the suffi-
ciency of asportation. This approach is especially appropriate where
the asportation requirement is the result of judicial interpretation of
the penal code.
188
The persistent use of asportation in many jurisdictions as the cen-
tral aggravating factor for elevating an imprisonment to the crime of
kidnapping is understandable, especially in light of the original pur-
pose at common law of punishing the unlawful carrying away of vic-
tims out of the country to obtain labor for American colonization. In
the era of modem transportation, however, kidnapping cannot be
viewed in terms of asportation. Although asportation can be a factor
in determining the quality and length of confinement, in many cases
the movement is simply irrelevant. California's effort to measure the
minimum number of feet required for kidnapping and New York's at-
tempt to determine how much movement no longer results in its
merger into another crime are just two examples of a court's faltering
because of its focus on asportation. The result is inevitable inconsis-
tency and confusion, since the focus of the inquiry, asportation, is not
the critical factor.
The Model Penal Code, with its emphasis on substantial isolation,
significantly contributes to a meaningful concept of the harm kidnap-
ping is intended to punish. Nevertheless, the final adopted draft, while
recognizing time as an alternative basis as some states do, declined to
eliminate the emphasis on asportation as a basis to define kidnapping.
Kidnapping has a notorious reputation in fiction and popular images.
A modern legal definition, focusing on the harm kidnapping generates
by the time and quality of isolation and de-emphasizing the metaphys-
187. See supra notes 13, 19, 39, 75, 97-99, 131, 168-70, 179 and accompanying text.
188. Id.
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ics of asportation, can properly be the basis for a crime that punishes a
specific harm that still flourishes in a world very different from the one
in which it was conceived.
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